Free Will Sourcehood and its alternatives Kevin Timpe

By:

Material type:

TextLanguage: English Publication details: London; Bloomsbury Academic; 2013Description: 234tr; Paperback; 15,5x23,5cmISBN:

9781441146427

Subject(s):

Free will and determinism

DDC classification:

123.5
K24-T59

Online resources:

Cover Image

Summary: There are two dominant general conceptions of the nature of free will. According to the first of these, free will is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does. On this view, free will centrally depends upon alternative possibilities. The second approach focuses instead on issues of sourcehood, holding that free will is primarily a function of an agent being the source of her actions in a particular way. This book demarcates these two different conceptions of freewill, explores the relationship between them, and examines how they relate to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. It ultimately argues for a version of Source incompatibilism.

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	Sách	Thư Viện Cơ Đốc									Available			TVCD-10569

There are two dominant general conceptions of the nature of free will. According to the first of these, free will is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does. On this view, free will centrally depends upon alternative possibilities. The second approach focuses instead on issues of sourcehood, holding that free will is primarily a function of an agent being the source of her actions in a particular way. This book demarcates these two different conceptions of freewill, explores the relationship between them, and examines how they relate to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. It ultimately argues for a version of Source incompatibilism.

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