01527nam a2200313 a 450000500170000000800200001702000180003704000330005504100080008808200100009608200120010610000170011810000110013524500140014624500360016024500160019626000110021226000240022326000090024730000110025630000140026730000160028152006980029765000300099585600730102591100280109899900170112695200700114320260119070930.02023-05-18 11:46:53  a9781441146427  cThư Viện Cơ Đốc  aeng  a123.5  bK24-T59  aTimpe, Kevin  eAuthor  aFree Will  bSourcehood and its alternatives  cKevin Timpe  aLondon  bBloomsbury Academic  c2013  a234tr.  bPaperback  c15,5x23,5cm  aThere are two dominant general conceptions of the nature of free will. According to the first of these, free will is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does. On this view, free will centrally depends upon alternative possibilities. The second approach focuses instead on issues of sourcehood, holding that free will is primarily a function of an agent being the source of her actions in a particular way. This book demarcates these two different conceptions of freewill, explores the relationship between them, and examines how they relate to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. It ultimately argues for a version of Source incompatibilism.  aFree will and determinism4 uhttps://data.thuviencodoc.org/books/10718/free-will.jpgyCover Image  aĐoàn Hữu Nghĩa  c10569d10569  00104070aTVCDbTVCDd2026-01-20g0.00l0pTVCD-10569v0.00yBK