| 000 | 01435nam a2200301 a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20260119070930.0 | ||
| 008 | 2023-05-18 11:46:53 | ||
| 020 | _a9781441146427 | ||
| 040 | _cThư Viện Cơ Đốc | ||
| 041 | _aeng | ||
| 082 | _a123.5 | ||
| 082 | _bK24-T59 | ||
| 100 | _aTimpe, Kevin | ||
| 100 | _eAuthor | ||
| 245 | _aFree Will | ||
| 245 | _bSourcehood and its alternatives | ||
| 245 | _cKevin Timpe | ||
| 260 | _aLondon | ||
| 260 | _bBloomsbury Academic | ||
| 260 | _c2013 | ||
| 300 | _a234tr. | ||
| 300 | _bPaperback | ||
| 300 | _c15,5x23,5cm | ||
| 520 | _aThere are two dominant general conceptions of the nature of free will. According to the first of these, free will is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does. On this view, free will centrally depends upon alternative possibilities. The second approach focuses instead on issues of sourcehood, holding that free will is primarily a function of an agent being the source of her actions in a particular way. This book demarcates these two different conceptions of freewill, explores the relationship between them, and examines how they relate to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. It ultimately argues for a version of Source incompatibilism. | ||
| 650 | _aFree will and determinism | ||
| 856 | 4 |
_uhttps://data.thuviencodoc.org/books/10718/free-will.jpg _yCover Image |
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| 911 | _aĐoàn Hữu Nghĩa | ||
| 999 |
_c10569 _d10569 |
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